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Boys, Be Ambitious:
William Smith Clark and the Westernization of Japanese Agricultural Extension in the
Meiji Era
In 1876, the Sapporo Agricultural College (SAC) opened in Japan. The founding
president was an American, William Smith Clark, whose nationality and nine years as the
president of Massachusetts Agricultural College (MAC) were his sole qualifications for the
position. Both colleges had experimental farms, offered primarily English-language instruction,
required military training and instruction in the Bible, and taught Western methods of agriculture
and the mechanic arts. Each institution sought to educate young men in the most up-to-date
methods of scientific agriculture and horticulture while also performing a key civic role.
SAC is an especially interesting case with which to investigate early American
agricultural extension: it was an essentially American export that took root in the landscape of
the Meiji restoration. To understand how this came to be, we examine the complicated
relationship between the American and Japanese governments, economies, and educational
systems in the late nineteenth century. Based on this historiography, our analysis indicates that
both countries were engaged in reactions to, and the development of, empire(s). The founding of
SAC provides a particularly compelling demonstration of this fact. It was also a notable false
start for both countries with SAC quickly abandoning American agricultural practices in favor of
models more suitable for the Japanese environment. However, even while it was unsuccessful as
a joint exercise in early imperial ambitions, the history of SAC provides compelling evidence of
the thoughts and motivations of both American and Meiji officials regarding the role of
agriculture in the creation of empire. To that end, we explore archival holdings at the University
of Massachusetts Amherst focused on William Smith Clark and his role at SAC.
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Building on this analysis, we conclude by conceptualizing of empire in a manner
consistent with Foucault’s theory of governmentality, wherein a nation-state’s ability to exert
control over a group of people exists independent of geographic territory.1 As such, even with its
limited impact, agricultural extension in Meiji Era Japan can clearly be seen as a “multiform
tactic” of empire rather than a benign social service.2 The internationalization of agricultural
extension served to move educational systems, Christianity, and economic partnerships from the
West to East. For the United States, intervention in Japan—having political, economic, military,
and agricultural dimensions—offered an opportunity to restrict the expansion of European
empires while also testing strategies that would shortly be employed in the direct colonization of
Hawaii and the Philippines. For Japan, an agricultural partnership with the United States served
as one strategy among many with which the Meiji government experimented that offered access
to the Western technology and organizing strategies that it would later need to secure its own
colonial holdings in Taiwan and Korea. Ultimately, agricultural extension became a tool of
empire-building for both countries even though this particular partnership was short-lived.
Japanese-American Relations in the 19th Century
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the United States and Japan were uneasy and
unequal allies. Having been largely closed to outsiders for more than two centuries, Japan found
itself the target of the West’s expansionist tendencies.3 These pressures came to a head in 1853
when Commodore Perry sailed a squadron of four American warships into Tokyo Bay and

1

Michel Foucault, Power, trans. R. Hurley, ed. J.D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2000).
Foucault, Power, 211.
3
Louis M. Cullen, A History of Japan, 1582-1941: Internal and External Worlds (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003); Marius B. Jansen, “The Meiji Restoration,” in The Cambridge History of Japan: the Nineteenth
Century, ed. Marius B. Jansen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
2
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delivered a missive from President Fillmore demanding access to Japanese ports.4 Cowed by the
“superior technology” of the West, Japan capitulated and opened two ports to Western trade;
treaties with other Western powers shortly followed.5 The exchange provides one of the earliest
successful examples of the American open-door policy, wherein the U.S. chose to forego
geographic expansion in exchange for access to foreign markets, and highlights both the growth
and limitations of American influence.6
The combination of these external pressures and ongoing strife within the Tokugawa
Shogunate led to the Meiji Restoration in 1868.7 The new government made a form of restrained
Westernization the centerpiece of its domestic policy agenda, which had major implications for
Japan’s foreign relations.8 The United States, due to its long-running special interest in Japan,
occupied a privileged role as a partner in that Westernization from the outset.9 Shortly after
Perry’s expedition, merchants, missionaries, educators, and a cadre of quasi-governmental
advisors augmented an official American presence in Japan.10 Further, the United States began to
relax some of the more onerous provisions of the earlier treaties—increasing its attractiveness as
a partner for the Japanese.11
For several reasons, the Meiji restoration came at a particularly opportune time for the
United States: 1) American foreign policy increasingly turned expansionist—though expansion
4

Nicholas J. Haiducek, Japanese Education: Made in the USA (New York, Praeger, 1991); George Feifer, Breaking
Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American Imperialism in 1853 (New York: Smithsonian Books,
2006).
5
Sukehiro Hirakawa, “Japan’s Turn to the West” in The Cambridge History of Japan: the Nineteenth Century, ed.
Marius B. Jansen, trans. B.T. Wakabayahi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 449.
6
Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
7
Jansen, “The Meiji Restoration.”
8
Martin Bronfenbrenner, Academic encounters: The American University in Japan and Korea (New York: Free
Press of Glencoe, 1961); William L. Neumann, America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).
9
In the near term, this position was rivaled only by Germany’s influence in the Meiji government. For more, see:
Richard Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000 (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
10
Hirakawa, “Japan’s Turn to the West.”
11
LaFeber, The New Empire.
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was initially achieved by economic means; and 2) concerns over Russia’s imperial ambitions
provoked a desire for a strong American presence in the Pacific.12 For Japan, the rude awakening
provided by Western intrusion into its domestic affairs forced the realization that Western
governments were rapidly carving up the globe into spheres of influence.13 This realization
offered only two paths forward for the Meiji government: life as the colonial subjects of a
Western power or rapid Westernization to preserve Japanese independence.14 In choosing
Westernization, the United States became an ally of convenience since it could help manage the
other Western governments with interests in Japan but lacked the imperial wherewithal to strip
Japan of its sovereignty.
Westernization & Imperial Ambitions
The behavior of the United States and of Japan during the late nineteenth century is only
understandable within the context of a larger historiographic theory of empire. 15 Despite its
reticence in declaring itself as a traditional empire in the mold of Britain or Russia, the United
States pursued imperial ambitions in line with much of Europe at the time.16 European
imperialism, however, is typically situated within common historical notions of imperialism,
which focus on formal delineations of control or instances in which states maintained direct
occupation and governance of territories.17 This type of imperial action is especially evident in

12

David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2009); Richard H. Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American
Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
13
Cullen, History of Japan.
14
Hirakawa, “Japan’s Turn to the West.”
15
Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire; Immerman, Empire for Liberty; LaFeber, The New Empire; Eric T.L.
Love, Race Over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 2004); Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of American as a Great Power (New York:
Harcourt Brace & World, 1961).
16
William Roger Louis, “Introduction” in Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, ed. William
Roger Louis (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976).
17
Louis, “Introduction.”
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the period preceding the 1884 Berlin conference.18 The United States largely eschewed this
approach, and instead adopted informal means of imperial control.
Historians hold differing perspectives on the motivations behind this divergence in
imperial behavior. Robinson and Gallagher maintain that geopolitics and strategic competition
drove informal imperial power. The upkeep of formal control was a costly affair, requiring
military commitment and an extensive resettlement of native citizens, but the need to preserve
any strategic advantage remained an absolute imperative. 19 Hobson and the proponents of New
Imperialism, however, argue that global imperialism throughout the nineteenth century was
mainly driven by economic forces.20 Capitalist states used coercive means to open new foreign
markets for new resources and markets once the limits of the home country became strained.
Critics of New Imperialism emphasize the primacy of geopolitics, yet the cause of such
maneuvering can also be attributed to competitive urges for greater industrial power.21 The
United States largely utilized imperial tactics in the pursuit of economic goals, with the forced
opening of Japanese ports as a paradigmatic example.22 A New Imperialist approach, therefore,
is a useful frame for understanding American imperial actions in Japan.
In late nineteenth-century America, economic goals took precedent over formal territorial
control when it came to American imperial ambition. As it recovered from the Civil War, the
United States systematically remade itself—most notably through expansion in the West.23
Lessons learned from Reconstruction and the rapid consolidation of Western territories provided

Louis, “Introduction.”
Louis, “Introduction.”
20
John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York: James Pott and Co., 1902).
21
Louis, “Introduction.”
22
Hobson, Imperialism.
23
Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990); Eric Foner, Reconstruction:
America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2002);
Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation (New York: Harper Collins, 2009).
18
19
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the blueprint for expansion overseas,24 which proximity dictated would occur via the Pacific.25
Indeed, the United States’ early efforts in Japan were fueled by the need for an expanding market
to serve as an outlet for the expanding American industrial base.26 As the economy expanded,
American business interests were not merely content to ply their wares in foreign ports; they
wanted those ports to resemble home, leading to the export of political thought and religion.27
From the Meiji government’s perspective, the soft imperialism of the United States offered a
welcome respite the aggression displayed by the Russians, French, and British elsewhere.28
The dominant historiography of the Meiji Restoration suggests that the Tokugawa
Shogunate fell due to the confluence of external forces and internal strife driven by increasing
recognition of the technological inferiority of Japanese industry.29 That same historiography goes
on to suggest that rapid Westernization offered the only viable independent path forward.30 By
voluntarily Westernizing, Meiji officials remained in power and selectively assimilated Western
innovations in a way that did not radically alter the prevailing social order.31 In his analysis of
Meiji Era agricultural policy, Sugihara noted: “The main policy goal was to activate and
modernize the existing rural economic structure, by providing the essential support, such as
education, market information, modern transport and energy.”32 To that end, the Meiji leaders

24

Cullen, A History of Japan.
Bronfenbrenner, Academic Encounter.
26
Cullen, A History of Japan; LaFeber, The New Empire; May, Imperial Democracy.
27
Bronfenbrenner, Academic Encounter; Immerman, Empire for Liberty; May, Imperial Democracy;
Michio Nagai, Higher Education in Japan: Its Take-off and Crash. Trans. J. Dusenbury (Tokyo: University of
Tokyo Press, 1971).
28
Bronfenbrenner, Academic Encounter; Neumann, American Encounters Japan.
29
Cullen, A History of Japan.
30
Akira Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status” in The Cambridge History of Japan: The Nineteenth Century,
ed. M.B. Jansen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
31
Nagai, Higher Education in Japan.
32
Kaoru Sugihara, “Agriculture and Industrialization: The Japanese Experience,” in Agriculture and
Industrialization: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day, ed. Peter Mathias and John A. Davis
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 149.
25
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also utilized a resurgent Japanese nationalism—driven by fear of Western military superiority—
to centralize, professionalize, and expand government infrastructure.33
Nonetheless, these efforts were contested; as Japan began to pursue its own imperial
ambitions in the 1880s and 1890s, it faced resistance from domestic critics as well as the
Western powers.34 Nowhere were these pressures more apparent than on Hokkaido, the
northernmost Japanese island and the closest to Russia. Hokkaido had long functioned as an
outlet for excess population and as a buffer zone with Russia. With the Tokugawa Shogunate’s
fall, it also became the home of dispossessed samurai from the central islands.35 As a result, early
reform efforts on Hokkaido were intended to move the island securely into the Japanese sphere
of influence and keep it from Russian control.36 Consequently, the founding of Sapporo
Agricultural College in the capital of the Hokkaido prefecture functioned as a mechanism of
social control, a step towards producing experts to reinforce and legitimate the Meiji
government, and one plank in a larger program of domestic Westernization and international
imperialism.37
Westernization as a Form of Anti-Colonialism and Colonialism
Economic considerations drove Westernization efforts from the 1850s onward. Foreign
influence entered Japan through its treaty ports and spread via the teachers, missionaries, cultural

33

Thomas R. H. Havens, Farm and Nation in Modern Japan: Agrarian Nationalism, 1870-1940 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974); Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status.”; Neumann, America Encounters
Japan.
34
Robert H. Ferrell, Foundations of American Diplomacy, 1775-1872 (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1968); LaFeber, The New Empire.
35
Marius B. Jansen, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge History of Japan: the Nineteenth Century, ed. Marius B.
Jansen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
36
Jansen, “The Meiji Restoration”; Stephen Vlastos, “Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885” in The
Cambridge History of Japan: the Nineteenth Century, ed. Marius B. Jansen (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
37
Foucault, Power; Joseph M. Henning, Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of
American-Japanese Relations (New York: New York University Press, 2000); Mark R. Nemec, Ivory Towers and
Nationalist Minds: Universities, Leadership, and the Development of the American State (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2006).
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materials, and Western-educated Japanese that flowed inland.38 Whereas the Tokugawa
Shogunate attempted to prevent Westernization’s spread, the Meiji government redirected it to
serve national interests. Early examples included the development of a Westernized military, the
adoption of new techniques for textile production, and the use of scientific agricultural
techniques.39 However, despite the economic linkages and Japan’s retrograde military
infrastructure, no Western power seems to have seriously entertained the notion of annexing
Japan during this time period. Two plausible explanations exist for this treatment: 1)
Westernization led to the perception of Japan as an “outpost of civilization”—essentially a
Western power in East Asia; and 2) Japan’s modernization provided enough material resources
that the annexation of Japan could not be undertaken in tandem while maintaining imperial
holdings elsewhere.40
Beyond the recognition of Japan as an outpost of Western civilization, Japan’s
Westernization also afforded it an industrial and economic base from which it could both protect
its own autonomy and exert hegemonic control of its own.41 Both Adams and Marshall have
argued that Japan’s Westernization and its attendant advantages and disadvantages are best
exemplified through early Meiji educational policy. 42 In effect, Japanese educational policy
served as a bulwark against colonialism by synthesizing Western knowledge through the lens of
Japanese culture.43
Subsequent events suggest that Japan learned the lessons of both Westernization and
empire well. Towards the end of the 1880’s, the Meiji government turned away from American
Jansen, “The Meiji Restoration.”
Sugihara, “Agriculture and Industrialization.”
40
Henning, Outposts of Civilization.
41
Henning, Outposts of Civilizations.
42
Donald Adams, Education and Modernization in Asia (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1970); Byron K. Marshall,
Learning to be Modern: Japanese Political Discourse on Education (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).
43
Benjamin C. Duke, The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 18721890 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009).
38
39

BOYS, BE AMBITIOUS

10

models of education and sought out the exemplar of military advancement offered by Germany.44
Later educational exchanges with Germany provided Japanese students with opportunities to
study German military structure, as well as to receive Prussian-style military training.45 In its
own imperial holdings in Taiwan and Korea, a program of Japanization—closely resembling
Westernization—allowed Japan to exert tighter central control.46 For example, Japan utilized
systematic educational reforms and changes in agricultural policy to demonstrate its hegemony
within its new holdings.47 Thus, Westernization occupied a paradoxical space in nineteenthcentury Japan: it was initially a domestic policy designed to deter foreign intervention, but later
became, in a modified way, a part of Japan’s own imperial activities in the Pacific.
Agriculture and Education in Japan
Educational policy played a prominent role in global diplomacy and imperial expansion.
According to Carnoy, education contributes to the formation of capitalist societies, and, within
the framework of New Imperialism, provides an avenue for cultural imperialism and
domination.48 Beginning in the eighteenth century, for example, Britain employed education as a
means of inculcating British norms and values throughout Indian society, with the ultimate goal
of creating capitalist consumers for Britain’s expanding markets.49 In this way, education helped
to ease along societal and governmental transformations, reforming feudal and traditional

44

Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000.
Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000.
46
Leo T.S. Ching, Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 2001); Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 18761945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
47
Chih-Ming Ka, Japanese colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Ping-Hui Liao and David D. Wang, eds., Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule,
1895-1945: History, Culture, Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Ramon M. Myers and
Yamada Saburo, “Agricultural Development in the Empire” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed.
Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); E. Patricia Tsurumi, “Colonial
Education in Korea and Taiwan” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers & Mark R.
Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
48
Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Co., 1974).
49
Carnoy, 1974.
45
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societies into modern capitalist states, and was a common, if not necessary, component of
informal imperial power in the mid to late nineteenth century.
The Meiji government also viewed educational policy as a form of diplomacy.50
Produced just months into the Meiji Restoration, the Kyoto Charter Oath articulated two of the
era’s defining impulses: 1) Japan would join the international community; and 2) scientific
inquiry and modern education would drive this work.51 Meiji reforms also ripped asunder
Japan’s underlying feudal structure; the samurai were displaced and a land value system of
taxation replaced one based on crop yield.52 Consequently, Japan started looking to the West for
ways to grapple with these ambitious goals and pervasive challenges.53
As Japan Westernized, it rapidly expanded its educational system with a goal of universal
literacy articulated in government policy as early as 1872.54 The Japanese government also
encouraged students to pursue advanced degrees abroad while it imported foreign expertise to
catalyze the creation of new universities.55 This emphasis on expertise mirrored post-Civil War
United States, wherein university-educated experts supported an expanded bureaucracy and,
ultimately, helped to legitimate the reemerging American state.56 To fully understand how these
things came to pass requires an analysis of the Western role in Japanese education, the structure
of Japanese postsecondary education, and the nature of agricultural education in Japan—both
generally and in Hokkaido specifically.

50

Duke, The History of Modern Japanese Education; Teruhisa Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern
Japan: State Authority and Intellectual Freedom, trans. S. Platzer (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988); Mark
E. Lincicome, Principle, Praxis, and the Politics of Educational Reform in Meiji Japan (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1995).
51
William G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978); Ishii Ryosuke, Japanese
Legislation in the Meiji Era, trans. W. J. Chambliss (Tokyo: Pan-Pacific Press, 1958).
52
Conrad Shirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations (Stamford: Thomson, 1989).
53
Shirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations.
54
Adams, Education and Modernization.
55
Duke, The History of Modern Japanese Education.
56
Nemec, Ivory Towers and Nationalist Minds.
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Even before the Meiji Restoration, growing interest in Western schooling existed in
Japan.57 Reformers like Fukuzawa Yukichi returned from diplomatic missions “less interested in
the material and technical marvels of the West than in how the schools and other institutions
were actually run.”58 According to the prevailing historiography, this interest in Western
education developed in response to the belief that Western militaries and economies arose from
their superior educational systems.59 As such, when the Meiji Restoration occurred, the policy of
bunmei kaika—civilization and enlightenment— assumed a place of prominence almost equal to
that of osei fukko—return to direct imperial rule.60 From the outset, the goal in this undertaking
was to “turn Western learning to Japan's advantage in its struggles against the colonialist
powers.”61 Consequently, the Meiji government subsidized the foreign study of future faculty
members and bureaucrats and imported large numbers of foreign scholars.62 Americans
dominated the faculty ranks at Tokyo University until the 1890s but were joined from the outset
and were eventually supplanted by Japanese scholars who were educated in the United States.63
These foreign-educated experts were not allowed to linger in the United States, as their
contributions were needed in the service of the new Japanese state.64 From the outset, Meiji
educational policy saw study abroad and the use of American faculty members only as a way to

57

Lincicome, Principle, Praxis, and the Politics of Educational Reform; Herbert Passin, Society and Education in
Japan (New York: Teacher’s College Press, 1965).
58
Passin, Society and Education in Japan, p. 64.
59
Akiyoshi Yonezawa, “Facing Crisis: Soft Power and Japanese Education in a Global Context,” in Soft Power
Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, eds. Yasushi Watanabe and David L.
McConnell (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2008).
60
Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology.
61
Horio, Educational Thought and Ideology, 29.
62
Yoshiyuki Kikuchi, Anglo-American Connections in Japanese Chemistry (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013); Marshall, Learning to be Modern.
63
Bronfenbrenner, Academic Encounter.
64
C.W. Brooks to William Smith Clark, 14 September 1871. William Smith Clark Papers (RG 003/1-1867).
Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries (hereafter c ited
as WSCP); Nemec, Ivory Towers and Nationalist Trends.
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produce the next generation of Japanese faculty—thereby decreasing Japan’s reliance on foreign
scholars and increasing its domestic expertise.65
Western educational influences extended into Japanese society as well. Hirakawa argued
that foreign teachers were responsible for introducing Western artifacts, such as Western
clothing, the solar calendar, and Sunday holidays. 66 While the Meiji attempted to minimize
Western influence, the prevailing historiography suggests that the rapidity of the Westernization
rendered those efforts futile. Western textbooks from the U.S. and Europe were frequently used,
introducing new ideas to Japan.67 Moreover, many teachers were also missionaries who insisted
on the use of the New Testament as a teaching tool. In fact, the Christian ideas introduced
through Western schooling posed a particular problem for Japan, as the classroom proved more
effective in spreading Christianity than the churchyard.68 As Howes noted, early Japanese
Christian communities grew up around schools, including William Smith Clark’s at Hokkaido.69
From the outset, agricultural education was seen as particularly critical to an independent
Japan since it offered a unique opportunity to build a new national identity in the rural and
remote segments of Japan.70 The Iwakura mission to United States and Europe from 1872-1873
found that Japanese agricultural prowess lagged well behind the Western nation-states and called
for a scientific approach to agriculture facilitated by specialized colleges.71 Shortly thereafter, the
Meiji government launched a series of policy changes designed to boost agricultural

Nemec, Ivory Towers and Nationalist Trends; Hirakawa, “Japan’s Turn to the West.”
Hirakawa, “Japan’s Turn to the West,” 470.
67
Passin, Society and Education in Japan, 71.
68
Hirakawa, “Japan’s Turn to the West.”
69
John F. Howes, “Japanese Christians and American Missionaries” in Changing Japanese Attitude Towards
Modernization, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
70
Nemec, Ivory Towers and Nationalist Trends.
71
Havens, Farm and Nation in Modern Japan.
65
66
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productivity.72 While these policies destabilized the status quo and prompted rural protests, they
laid the foundation for modern agriculture in Japan.73
Since poor rice harvests could sway the Japanese domestic economy and yields were
particularly poor in 1865 and 1866, these shifts can be seen as part of a growing government
interest in agriculture that would come to include the establishment of experiment stations in
1877.74 As Hayami noted, until the creation of these experiment stations, government policy had
only emphasized the introduction of Westernized agriculture.75 Unfortunately, these attempts
almost always met with failure. When viewed through Western eyes, Japanese farming utilized
irregular plots of land; insufficient mechanical and draft animal infrastructure; and strange crops.
When Westernized agriculture attempted to change these conditions, they proved to be adaptive
responses to the Japanese physical geography, and, outside the unique landscape of Hokkaido,
Western improvements were largely unsuccessful. The creation of the experiment stations thus
represented the dawning recognition that Westernized agriculture was not a panacea.
We see all of these trends encapsulated at Hokkaido. American efforts in Hokkaido began
with an 1871-1872 delegation headed by General Horace Capron—Commissioner of Agriculture
under President Ulysses Grant—that recommended the creation of an agricultural college.
Shortly thereafter, William Smith Clark spent fourteen months from 1876-1877 as the founding
president of Sapporo Agricultural College. The prevailing historiography suggests that this short

E. Sidney Crawcour, “Economic Change in the Nineteenth Century” in The Cambridge History of Japan, ed.
Marius B. Jensen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Richard J. Smethurst, Agricultural Development
and Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 1870-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
73
Smethurst, Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes; Vlastos, “Opposition Movements in Early Meiji.”
74
Cullen, A History of Japan; Havens, Farm and Nation in Modern Japan.
75
Yujiro Hayami, A Century of Agricultural Growth in Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1975).
72
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stay belies the remarkable impact of his presence, and indeed, Clark is still fondly remembered at
Hokkaido as his work was continued by his students and colleagues who remained in Japan.76
William Smith Clark at Hokkaido
Previous historical work has established the obstacles facing agricultural extension in the
nineteenth century: a lack of funding, a lack of support or coordinated action, and an extreme
reluctance on the part of working farmers to incorporate agricultural innovations into their daily
practice.77 Throughout the century, those interested in disseminating agricultural research to the
working farmer tried a number of methods: the creation of agricultural societies, fairs and
exhibitions to display and demonstrate recent innovations, agricultural magazines and
periodicals, formal education in the recently-established land-grant institutions, and farmer’s
institutes for those uninterested in college.78 As a result, agricultural extension and education
could best be described as unsettled during William Smith Clark’s tenures as president of MAC
and SAC. Though extension had American roots reaching as far back as the Early Republic, an
upsurge of European interest in agricultural improvement led to increased American interest; in
response, American policy-makers and politicians turned to extension to protect and promote
American agricultural and economic vitality.79
William Smith Clark was involved with the creation of MAC from its conception after
the passage of the first Morrill Act in 1861. He lobbied heavily for the land-grant institution to
76

Bronfenbrenner, Academic Encounter; John M. Maki, A Yankee in Hokkaido: The Life of William Smith Clark
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002); Passin, Society and Education in Japan.
77
Roy V. Scott, The Reluctant Farmer: The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914 (Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1970).
78
Adam R. Nelson, “Institutionalizing Agricultural Research in the Early American Republic: An International
Perspective,” Perspectives on the History of Higher Education 30 (2013); Scott, The Reluctant Farmer; Jeff
Zacharakis, “Extension and Community: The Practice of Popular and Progressive Education,” New Directions for
Adult and Continuing Education 117 (2008); Nathan M. Sorber, “Creating Colleges of Science, Industry, and
National Advancement: The Origins of the New England Land-Grant Colleges,” Perspectives on the History of
Higher Education 30 (2013).
79
Nelson, “Institutionalizing Agricultural Research in the Early American Republic”; Scott, The Reluctant Farmer;
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be located in western Massachusetts, near Amherst College, where he was employed at that
time.80 Two other men served as MAC president during its earliest days, and, following the
resignation of Paul Ansel Chadbourne in 1866 due to ill-health, the board of trustees offered the
job to Clark.81 MAC’s early curriculum favored practical training in agriculture and horticulture;
students were expected to work several hours each day on the “experimental farm” established
concurrently with the college.82
Though Clark was an ardent believer in agricultural education, he had difficulties
securing the support MAC needed; the college was perpetually in need of funding and faced
criticism from educators and farmers alike.83 Farmers were not impressed by the experimental
farm and thought the curriculum too bookish while other college leaders thought that the
curriculum lacked academic rigor.84 Despite MAC’s perennial problems, Clark was a wellknown public figure who had set up an agricultural college complete with an experimental farm,
a liberal arts curriculum that also emphasized engineering, and military training—an oftneglected facet of American land-grant education that produced a pool of potential soldiers to
serve the state. While they failed to impress his American counterparts in Massachusetts and
elsewhere, all of these attributes made a positive impression on the Meiji government.85
A long courtship occurred between Clark and Japanese officials before he was asked to
establish SAC. In 1871, Clark maintained a business contact with fellow Massachusetts native
Horace Capron, who served as the principal foreign advisor to General Kuroda Kiyotaka in
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Hokkaido.86 Upon the request of Mori Arinori, the Japanese chargé d’affaires at the legation in
Washington, Capron recommended MAC as “the best educational institution for a Japanese
youth of high rank” in the United States.87 Clark welcomed Mori’s chosen student, Naito Seitaro,
in 1872 along with several other Japanese students interested in the study of modern, Western
agriculture.88 While visiting Naito in the summer of that year, Mori exclaimed that “[MAC] is
the kind of an institution Japan must have, that is what we need, an institution that shall teach
young men to feed themselves and to defend themselves.”89
Contact continued thereafter. In September 1871, Charles Wolcott Brooks, the Japanese
consul in San Francisco, thanked Clark for sending him MAC’s annual report, noting that “the
Government of Japan are now educating several thousand students in all the branches of a
scientifically developed education.”90 Brooks suggested that further students be sent abroad to be
educated; however “as Japan requires a great deal with a comparatively limited time, her first
scholars cannot be allowed to remain as long or to acquire as thorough and detailed a knowledge
as those who come later.”91 The immediacy of Japan’s modernizing needs largely precluded
extended academic stays, and a pillar of the new Meiji Government’s education policy aimed for
the “elevation of Japan intellectually, morally and physically.”92 Mori also sought the advice of
Clark, along with many other American college and university presidents, on commercial,
agricultural, and industrial education.93
The archives are largely silent on the subject of when and how Clark was asked to
establish a Japanese agricultural college. We do know that Clark submitted his request for leave
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to the MAC Board of Trustees in January 1876 in order to serve as President of SAC in
Hokkaido, citing the “positive advantage” for the College to serve as a model for Japanese
agricultural education.94 The Board assented, and a contract between Clark and the Meiji
Government was signed on March 3, 1876:
[Clark] will serve the Japanese Government, and perform all the duties assigned to him,
for the term of one year from the twentieth day of fifth month, ninth year of Meiji,
corresponding with the twentieth day of May 1876 to the twentieth day of the fifth month
tenth year of Meiji, corresponding with the twentieth day of May 1877, in the capacity of
Assistant Director, President and Professor of Agriculture, Chemistry, Mathematics and
the English Language, at the Sapporo College, Hokkaido, Japan, under the management
of the Kaitakushi.95
Clark selected two former students, William Wheeler and David Penhallow, to teach at
Sapporo—where the three men alone would be responsible for delivering a curriculum that
mirrored MAC’s.96
Clark arrived in Hokkaido on his fiftieth birthday, July 31, 1876.97 He immediately set
about refining the College’s structure to match the ambitions of Mori and his Meiji colleagues.98
A copy of the new daily routine under Clark details a rigorous class schedule of English,
geometry, arithmetic, and botany, among others.99 Even the Prime Minister, Sanjo Sanetomi,
took interest in Clark’s work, noting his satisfaction in a letter to SAC Director Zushio Hirotake:
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I am happy to know that the students of Sapporo College are making progress under the
exceptionally diligent instruction of President Clark. Upon my return to Tokio, I shall
report the particulars to the Mikado, and I doubt not His Majesty will be gratified. Please
communicate this to President Clark.100
A full reorganization of the SAC took a few weeks more, but by September 1876, Clark sent a
copy of his proposal to General Kuroda and the Kaitakushi, the governing body of Hokkaido:
The following branches of knowledge will be regarded as important parts of the College
curriculum: The Japanese and English Languages; Elocution, Composition, Drawing,
Bookkeeping and forms of Business; Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, Surveying, Civil
Engineering so far as required in the construction of ordinary roads and railroads, and of
works for drainage and irrigation; Physics, with particular attention to Mechanics;
Astronomy, Chemistry, with special regard to Agriculture and Metallurgy; Botany,
Structural, Physiological and Systematic Zoology, Human and Comparative Anatomy
and Physiology, Geology, Political Economy, Mental and Moral Science, and the most
thorough instruction in the theory and practice of Agriculture and Horticulture, the
various topics being discussed with constant reference to the circumstances and
necessities of the farmers of Hokkaido.101
Like MAC’s, this ambitious course of study closely resembled those of generic American liberal
arts colleges of the time, despite its supposed focus on agriculture and civil engineering.
Following four years of study, it would award a Bachelor of Science degree.102 The general rules
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further mandated four hours of daily study to match the four hours of daily classes.103 Clark also
required that new students must be “sixteen years of age, of sound constitution and good moral
character.” Additionally, the Kaitakushi required that they sign a contract obliging them to work
for the Hokkaido government following graduation.104 The inclusion of so many of the
traditional liberal arts, such as languages and moral science, belies the focus on agricultural
education. The Meiji government wanted an imitation of MAC in Sapporo, importing both its
agricultural knowledge as well as the liberal accoutrements common to American colleges.
These other bodies of knowledge also acted as Westernizing influences in the landscape of Meiji
educational policy.
Perhaps one of Clark’s most important acts at SAC also occurred in September 1876 with
his request of a training farm for the College.105 In a letter to the Kaitakushi, Clark recommends
that “a well-equipped farm be placed under the exclusive control of a foreign Professor of
Agriculture, who shall be under the direction and authority of the President of the College,” for
“the proper training of the students of [SAC] in practical agriculture, and especially in the correct
mode of farm management, with due regard to economy of labor, the production of profitable
crops and stock, and the maintenance of fertility in the soil.”106 The training farm could
implement the “most rational and approved system of farm economy,” and, according to Clark’s
specific stipulation, “only such crops and stock should be raised as are likely to be worth their
cost, and as far as practicable hand implements and human labor should be replaced by
agricultural machines and the working of horses and cattle.”107 Clark’s scientific interests
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supplemented his pragmatic desires, further noting that: “Experiments with new crops, fertilizers
and machines, as well as with manufactures such as silk, sugar, beer, vinegar will of course be
exceptions to the above general rules, but should always be conducted in the outset upon a
moderate scale.”108 The Kaitakushi agreed to Clark’s requests—writing:
The Sapporo government farm was established for the purpose of furnishing the people a
model in agriculture. After consultation with Gen. Horace Capron some years ago,
sufficient experiments in producing various crops, raising livestock and general farm
management, have been made to demonstrate the adaptation of these things to the climate
and soil of Hokkaido. As, however, the customs and ideas of the olden time are yet
prevalent, the general introduction of new methods is difficult.109
General Kuroda’s Meiji loyalties and Westernized ambitions are evident in the transfer of the
farm to SAC—expressing his “desire to establish upon it the best possible system of agriculture,
and to substitute for all the old Japanese habits the best foreign style of farming.”110 Clark was
appointed director of the SAC farm in addition to his presidential duties, a portfolio with which
he expressed some discomfort: “My contract with the government expires on the twentieth of
next May, so that with my best endeavors I could hardly assume control and organize the work
for the coming season before the time of my departure for home.”111 Another of Clark’s MAC
students, William P. Brooks, arrived shortly thereafter and assumed responsibility for the
farm.112
In March 1877, the Kaitakushi sought Clark’s advice on forestry policy, and he
responded with earnest detail:
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Many centuries ago the kings of England enacted laws for the protection of deer and
other wild game and in accordance with the spirit of the times imposed the severest
penalties for their violation. More than sixty large tracts of country were converted into
forests for the preservation of deer and other game and most of these are still retained as
royal forests and carefully guarded by officers appointed for the purpose. Though
originally intended merely to preserve game, they yield at the present time a large
revenue from the sale of timber.113
Clark’s thinking on sound forestry policy, as well as its economic and political benefits,
demonstrates the Western impulses of his advisory role, noting that “every tree is property and
belongs to the owner of the land on which it stands, and every person who injures or cuts a tree
on government land should be treated as a trespasser.”114 Clark also saw the opportunity for
further expansion into Hokkaido, and he recommended that: “good land should be sold to settlers
at a very low rate so that all can buy what they need for fuel and lumber.”115 According to Maki,
Clark’s forestry advice still informs contemporary Japanese forestry agencies.116
Clark also saw his time in Japan as an opportunity for missionary work. In an early
conversation with General Kuroda, Clark advocated the teaching of the Bible, despite a longtime
ban on Christianity.117 Kuroda eventually relented, and Clark received Bibles from a missionary
in Yokohama to be distributed to his students.118 In November 1876, the students of SAC signed
a pledge in which they “solemnly [promised] to abstain entirely from the use in any form, except
medicine, of opium, tobacco and alcohol, liquors; and also, from gambling and profane swearing
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so long as [they were] connected with the institution.”119 The pledge was followed by a request
to Clark: “We all desire to study the Bible. So we humbly ask your favor that you will teach us it
every Sunday hereafter.”120 Clark noted the pledge as an example of “what heathen college
students are capable of,” asking “what Christian college can do better?”121
Clark’s Christianizing efforts extended beyond his tenure in Japan. Following his return
to Amherst, Clark maintained contact with the Christian community in Hokkaido. One such
update read: “You will be delighted to learn that, in August last, Rev. M.C. Harris, our American
missionary, visited Sapporo and baptized the entire sophomore class into the name of the Father,
and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”122 Clark’s pride in his missionary legacy can be seen in
his sharing of this information—writing in August 1878: that “my students in Sapporo continue
steadfast in the faith and are very earnest and successful Christians. Rev. M.C. Harris of
Hakodati has recently baptized seven Freshmen, and the Kaitakushi does not interfere.”123 Clark
even attributed the success of SAC to divine intervention:
It is indeed remarkable that so excellent an English College and Preparatory School
should be so liberally sustained in the wilds of Yeaso. The Lord’s hand is clearly in it!
We have just parted with a most admirable Christian brother, Rev. Mr. Davis, that he
might go and labor with you for the evangelization of “Dai Nippon.”124
The “Covenant of Believers in Jesus,” as the organized Christian students of SAC referred to
themselves, endeavored to create an independent church in order to avoid the controlling
interference of foreign missionaries and churches.125 Consequently, even while Westernization
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functioned as the leading edge for profound cultural changes, the Meiji Era’s emphasis on a
moderated approach led to a distinctly Japanese form of Christian community at Hokkaido.
Word of Clark’s successes in Hokkaido followed him home to Massachusetts. In
September 1877, Clark received a letter from General Kuroda, who thanked Clark for his work
in teaching Japanese students “that useful branch of science in order to enable them in future to
undertake the task of developing the Islands of Hokkaido”126:
It is now scarcely a year since you entered upon that responsible duty, but by your
zealous efforts and hard work, not only has the system of the College been properly
established by also the students have already made considerable progress. Indeed it
would have been impossible to effect such a speedy success, had its organization and
system of instruction not been well planned.127
Kuroda also noted that “there is hardly a doubt that, by following the course of education you
marked out, and with the help of the . . . the three professors you leave behind, many useful men
will in future come out from that College.”128 Clark replied in October:
I am exceedingly grateful for all your confidence and generous kindness to me while in
your service, and only regret that I was able to accomplish so little for Japan in
consequence of the shortness of my time, my ignorance of the language and customs of
your people, and my limit of ability. [. . .] If you employ wise and good men as
professors in the Sapporo College, I am sure its graduates will become most excellent and
intelligent officers, and assist most efficiently in the execution of your plans for the
improvement of the country.129
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Kuroda’s recognition that SAC produced useful men also highlights the transformative influence
of American education practices in reinforcing expertise and service as components of the new
state.130 While Clark worried about the potential implications of such power, his reply to the
General shows his pride and satisfaction in the work accomplished in Hokkaido.131
William Smith Clark made his final farewell to Hokkaido on April 16, 1877, exactly
eight and a half months after his initial arrival.132 Observers left behind varying accounts of his
famous final address: Oshima Masatake writes that Clark “mounted again on horseback and
taking rein in one hand, and a whip in the other looked back toward us, and called aloud: ‘Boys,
be ambitious like this old man.’”133 Still earlier writings provide different versions: “Boys, be
ambitious for Christ!,” “Boys, be ambitious for good!,” and “Boys, be ambitious not for money
or selfish aggrandizement, not for that evanescent thing which men call fame. Be ambitious for
the attainment of all that a man ought to be!”134 The historical record is unclear about which of
these accounts may be the true one, or that Clark even made a parting statement. The discursive
space created by the accounts, however, allows us to consider the contradiction between Clark’s
injunctions and Japan’s ultimate imperial ambitions. Though Clark insisted that ambitions for
worldly pursuits should take second place to ambitions for good, the creation of an agricultural
college in Hokkaido reveals Japan’s use of “multiform tactics” in the pursuit of its own
governmental and regulatory ambitions. Despite the inconsistencies, Clark’s declaration of
“Boys, be ambitious” retains an important place in Japanese culture, reminiscent of both the
progressive and paternalistic aspects of the export of Western education principles and scientific
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agriculture to the Japanese context.135 Though Clark’s influence faded in the United States upon
his return, his westernizing legacy lived on in Hokkaido and Japan as a whole.
Conclusion: Extension and Empire
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault posited that, starting in the 17th century, western
European monarchies moved from a system in which the sovereign maintained “power over
death” to one that emphasized government’s “power over life.”136 Citing both discipline and
biopower as two methods of managing “power over life”, Foucault sees the use of these tools are
part of a society’s progression towards what we might call modernity, as long as we
acknowledge the constructed and historically contingent nature of that term. The concept of
biopower and its related theory of governmentality offer a more complex view of the story of
American agricultural extension in nineteenth-century Japan, American and Japanese imperial
ambitions, and the mechanisms that made their empires possible.
Biopower “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of the explicit calculations and
made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.”137 Biopower, less a form of
power in itself and more a technique of power, helps governments regulate populations by
regulating the behaviors of those populations. As Foucault lectured, “this new nondisciplinary
power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if
you like, to man-as-species.”138 Large numbers of people require management in order to ensure
the survival, health, and happiness of those individuals—and ultimately of the state, which will
avoid being rocked by revolt or discontent. Biopower focuses on the things that effect people on
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a very large scale, such as birth rates and mortality rates, life expectancy, the control of
epidemics and other social ills. Thus, biopower is a regulatory technology that manages
populations in the pursuit of balance and continuity of the state—and one of the state’s most
effective biopolitical tools is education.
Just as the concept of biopower provides education with a regulatory role, Foucault’s
theorization of governmentality offers a nuanced interpretation of education and empire. While
neither the United States nor Japan could be considered an empire in the 1870s, both nations
displayed imperial ambitions and could be thought of as nascent imperial powers from the point
of view of theories of empire that distinguish between economic and hegemonic power. Though
historically economic and hegemonic forces have been unified under the auspices of a sovereign
government, there is no structural reason that they must.139 We draw on Foucault’s definition of
governmentality, which holds that:
. . . what government has to do with is not territory but, rather, a sort of complex
composed of men and things. The things, in this sense, with which government is to be
concerned are in fact men, but men in their relation, their links, their imbrication with
those things that are wealth resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific
qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on: men in their relation to those other things
that are customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; finally men in their
relation to those still other things that might be accidents or misfortunes such as famine,
epidemics, death, and so on.140
In this conceptualization, territory is but a means to an end: that is, the acquisition of territory has
historically allowed governments to exert control over the lives of those in that territory.
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Governmentality involves the ability of governments to regulate individuals through indirect
mechanisms—rather than relying on the direct imposition of the law, governmentality relies on
biopolitical controls to discipline and manage populations. As Foucault explained, “the finality
of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and
intensification of the processes it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being
laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics.”141
Among the most important of these “multiform tactics” are education, religion, and
economy, and all of those were present in the founding of Sapporo Agricultural College in Meiji
Japan. Foucault emphasized that “whole complex of knowledges” must be created to legitimate
authority, and others have noted the key role that higher education plays in legitimating social
and political order.142 Education, a technique of governmental and biopolitical regulatory control,
extended the power of the Meiji government in Hokkaido, fully incorporating it into their sphere
and protecting it from their aggressive Russian neighbors. Notably, this sort of regulation of
biopower serves as a multiform tactic of empire even when the innovation it introduces—in this
case, Westernized agriculture—does not work. Simply by disrupting their daily lives, the Meiji
government reinforced its control over their citizenry.
Further supporting this argument, Foucault also argued that “the apparatuses of security”
are the mechanism by which governmental power is legitimated in a post-feudal landscape; a
landscape which, notably, Japan was just entering into in the second half of the nineteenth
century.143 By suggesting that SAC would help prevent economic scarcity, both the Japanese and
American governments held out the hope for security and promoted their roles in the
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perpetuation thereof. These efforts were coupled with other “multiform tactics” promoted by
imported American educational experts, such as William Smith Clark, in the form of
Christianity, consumer goods, and other Western influences to the Japanese environment.
With this theoretical framework in mind, agricultural extension takes on imperial
proportions as one of these “multiform tactics”—a biopolitical control that helped exert power
over and regulate the population in a distant province of the nascent Japanese empire. In the
United States, demonstration farms, land-grant institutions, experiment stations and, ultimately, a
nation-wide cooperative extension system brought scientific agriculture to the nation’s farmers
while also altering the ways they farmed and interacted with the state. In Japan, American
agricultural extension functioned differently: It served principally as a disruption to the status
quo, but it was nonetheless a “multiform tactic” of empire. William Smith Clark’s work in
Hokkaido, which brought a new system of higher education, Christian theology, and further
inculcation into the world economy, fits well within the developing narrative of imperialism and
empire in the late nineteenth century. Whatever the meaning behind Clark’s famous parting
words to his students or the success of his stay in Japan, Japan’s use of Western technology and
ideology allowed it to be ambitious as well— ambitious in the pursuit of empire.

